JIPYONG LLC

[Case No. Supreme Court decision 2016du41071 dated April 29, 2020]

The Supreme Court held that congenital diseases of unborn babies arising out of the employment of pregnant women are deemed occupational accidents as set forth under Article 5(1) of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act regardless of the connection to the female employees’ ability to work. 

The plaintiffs were nurses working at the hospital. They became pregnant in 2009 and gave birth in 2010 to the babies who were born with congenital heart diseases. Three out of the four plaintiffs suffered signs of miscarriage on the fourth week of pregnancy. The plaintiffs argued that they were exposed to the conditions which were harmful to the health of the pregnant women and fetuses which gave rise to the damage in the formation of the heart of the fetus. They argued therefore the heart disease of the babies were occupational accidents in seeking allowances from the defendant government agency in 2012. The defendant rejected the claim on the grounds that the occupational accidents under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act refers to the injury, sickness or death of the worker himself or herself and that the plaintiff’s children cannot be deemed the workers covered under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act. 

The plaintiffs later filed the same claim to the defendant again in 2013 but the defendant refused on the grounds that the agency requested for additional materials, yet the medical records were not provided and the details of the conditions could not be verified. 

The lower court held that the defendant’s refusal was legitimate on the grounds that (i) the diseases were of the babies, not of the plaintiffs themselves and (ii) the plaintiffs, who are independent from the babies, could not be entitled to the allowances with relations to the diseases of the babies. 

However, the Supreme Court held that the diseases of the unborn babies arising out of the employment of the pregnant women were deemed occupational accidents as set forth under Article 5(1) of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act without requiring any connection to the employees’ ability to work for the following reasons. 

(i) The female employees who are pregnant should be sufficiently protected from the risks at the workplace which may arise in the course of the pregnancy and delivery. The state has the responsibility to provide sufficient protection for the female employees in view of the meanings of the provisions of the Constitution under Article 32(4) and Article 36(2) of the Constitution. 

(ii) While human beings are entitled to the rights and obligations during their lifetime pursuant to Article 3 of the Civil Act, fetuses do not have the same rights unless there are individual laws that provide otherwise. Given that the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act is not one of the laws that provide for the rights for the fetus, the mother and the fetus are treated as one body. Therefore, the disease of the fetus is deemed an occupational accident on the female employee without relations to the female employees’ ability to work. 

(iii) The proper interpretation of the workers’ compensation system would be to have the risks of occupational accidents be shared under the public insurance rather than have the risks imposed on the employer or the employee in their entirety.

The Supreme Court continued that, once an occupational accident of an employee establishes the basic legal relationship relating to the receipt of the insurance benefits under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act, the employee will be entitled to the benefits even if the employee thereafter loses the employee status. Article 88(1) of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act provides “Each employee’s entitlement to insurance benefits shall not be extinguished by his/her retirement.” Once a pregnant female employee suffers an occupational accident damaging the health of the fetus which is a part of the body of the mother and the employee becomes entitled to the benefits pursuant to the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act, even if the fetus which was a part of the body of the mother becomes separated by the delivery of the baby, the employee’s right will not expire. The employee after the delivery does not lose the right to receive the benefits as to the disease of the baby separated from the body of the mother after giving birth.

The Supreme Court therefore held that the lower court’s decision holding that the government agency’s refusal was proper on the ground the plaintiffs could not be entitled to the benefits as to the diseases of the babies was improperly based on a misinterpretation of the legal principles concerning the occupational accident and the beneficiary of the allowances under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded.